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1 Introduction
This paper studies the strategic interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies
in the context of the two-country DSGE model of Quint and Rabanal (2014) estimated for
the euro area. Their framework allows us to analyze the current policy landscape in the
EMU, where the ECB is charged as the single monetary authority with the task to maintain
price stability, while at the same time its macroprudential responsibilities at area-wide level are
shared with national prudential authorities. This multilayer-feature of policy setting makes
cooperation across the several authorities a challenging task. We investigate the consequences
on macroeconomic stability when this cooperation fails, and identify the cases in which it might
not even be desirable for authorities to cooperate when it concerns the pursuit of regional
(or country-specic) objectives. We perform our analysis in a setup where each authority is
assumed to minimize an assigned loss function, and behave as a player in an interaction game
that is either cooperative or non-cooperative. We compute nash and leadership equilibria
in order to distinguish between alternative timings of the playersmoves. We compare the
solutions in the following two alternative settings. First, we distinguish between a common
EMU-wide monetary and macroprudential authority, both pursuing area-wide objectives, and
therefore ignoring regional imbalances and heterogeneity across the euro-area. This is a case
of two players similar in spirit to the approaches undertaken particularly in closed economy
setups, such as the analysis performed by De Paoli and Paustian (2013), Angelini et al. (2012),
Bean et al. (2010), Beau et al. (2012), Darracq Paries et al. (2011), Gelain and Ilbas (2016),
and others. In the second setting, we assume that macroprudential duties are performed at the
regional level1, where one authority is in charge of prudential policy in the core and another one
in the periphery, both pursuing regional nancial stability objectives, while the ECB continues
being in charge of area-wide price stability. Therefore, in this second setting, there are three
players whose cooperative and non-cooperative interactions are analyzed. Allowing for three
players to interact in the policy game yields a broader, and more realistic policy analysis within
the context of a monetary union. In this respect, the current paper di¤ers most from the existing
literature. In particular, to our knowledge, other papers that consider a similar, two-country
setup to analyze interactions between policy makers, such as Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) and
Quint and Rabanal (2014), do not take into account the e¤ects of strategic interactions between
more than two players.
We nd that the gains from leadership of either the ECB or the prudential regulator in the
two-player setting, giving the leader the rst mover advantage, are limited. In this case where
the ECB and macroprudential policy are conducted at the union-wide level, the most favorable
outcome is achieved under cooperative and nash equilibria. However, successful stabilization
of union-wide objectives comes at the cost of highly volatile credit-to-GDP ratios in both the
core and the periphery (while being very stable in the union as a whole). Focusing on non-
cooperative policies but assigning real union-wide GDP growth as a common objective leads
1While in reality the ECB and national authorities have shared competences, the role of the former is limited
to imposing stricter capital requirements as foreseen in the EU legislations. Allowing for only national prudential
authorities however simplies the analysis without too much loss of realism.
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to non-cooperation outperforming cooperation, but it does not remove the excessive regional-
level volatility in the credit-to-GDP ratio. Introducing regional prudential regulators focusing
on their own, region-specic objectives leads to a situation in which non-cooperation performs
better that cooperation, provided policymakers choose their policies simultaneously. Assigning
to the ECB the leadership role can lead to worse outcomes in the three-player setting since
it implies more focus on union-wide objectives. However, assigning macroprudential policy
to regional authorities contains the volatility in the credit-to-GDP ratios in the core and the
periphery, at the cost of slightly higher union-wide ination and output growth volatility.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the modeling framework based on
Quint and Rabanal (2014). Section 3 explains the monetary and macroprudential policy frame-
work adopted throughout the paper. Section 4 presents the results of the strategic interactions
between monetary and macroprudential policy at the union-wide level, while section 5 shows
the results of interactions between monetary policy and regional macro-prudential authorities.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The modeling framework
Our analysis is conducted using the model developed and estimated in Quint and Rabanal
(2014). Briey, the Quint and Rabanal (2014) model is one of Europe and contains two
regions, which are labeled the core and the periphery. The core consists of France and
Germany while the periphery contains Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Each region
has sectors that produce non-durables, which can be consumed or traded, and durables, which
cannot be traded and are accumulated (subject to an adjustment cost) to augment the housing
stock. The durables and non-durables sectors are monopolistically competitive, consisting of
intermediate-good producers who set their price subject to a Calvo-based (Calvo, 1983) price
rigidity and ination indexation (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005).
On the demand side, each region is populated by two types of households: savers and
borrowers, where borrowers are more impatient than savers and are characterized by lower
discount factors. Both types of household obtain utility by consuming non-durable goods and
housing services, and obtain disutility by supplying labor. The nominal wage is perfectly
exible and both types of households work to produce durables and non-durables. However,
there is a labor reallocation cost associated with labor moving from one sector to the other. For
both patient and impatient households, the consumption of non-durable goods exhibits external
habit formation.
Each region contains nancial intermediaries. These intermediaries receive the savings of the
patient households and lend to the impatient households. Excess savings in one region can be
transferred to the other through the purchase of one-period nominal bonds from an international
intermediary. Impatient households, or borrowers, obtain one-period nominal loans from their
regional nancial intermediary, using the value of their housing stock as collateral. However,
the quality of housing as collateral is subject to an idiosyncratic shock and this creates some
risk that a borrower may not repay their loan. When the value of the housing stock is less
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than the loan repayment, then the borrower will default. When default occurs, the borrower
pays the houses collateral value, which is split between the nancial intermediary and a debt
collection agency, and keeps their house. The revenues generated by the debt collectors are
returned (lump-sum) to savers. Where the regional nancial intermediaries are risk neutral, the
international nancial intermediary charges a risk premium (related to the regions debt-to-GDP
ratio) on regional borrowing.
While the resulting model is large, with multiple regions, sectors, and agents, we use this
model, not only because it is estimated, but because it provides roles for both monetary policy
and macroprudential policy and it allows the e¤ects of these policies on the economies of the
core and the periphery to be considered.
2.1 Key shocks and policy channels
Risk shocks are an important feature of the model. Borrowers face an idiosyncratic shock
to the value of their collateral (their housing stock) and are more likely to default on their
loan when the idiosyncratic shock is small and their collateral has less value. The standard
deviation of each idiosyncratic shock is stochastic and assumed to follow an autoregressive
process. An increase in the standard deviation a¤ects the volatility, but not the mean of the
shock to collateral quality, and is termed a risk shock. When a risk shock occurs, because the
variance of collateral quality rises, it becomes more likely that realized collateral quality will
be below the default threshold, increasing the default rate, which raises the credit spread and
adversely e¤ects the balance sheet of nancial intermediaries with ongoing adverse e¤ects on
bank lending. One way to think about these risk shocks is that they raise the loan-to-value
ratio for borrowers. Other shocks that also raise the loan-to-value ratio will have similar e¤ects
on the default rate, the credit spread, and bank lending.
The policy instrument for the monetary authority is assumed to be the bank deposit rate,
which, because monetary policy is conducted at the union-wide level, means nancial interme-
diaries in both regions pay the same rate on deposits. A tightening of monetary policy has
the e¤ect of raising the deposit rate, which encourages saving by the patient households and
discourages borrowing by the impatient households. As such, tighter monetary policy has the
usual damping e¤ect on consumption. However, the higher deposit rate also raises the cost of
providing loans which gets passed on to borrowers through a higher lending rate and can lower
the value of housing collateral. All else constant, a higher lending rate raises the loan-to-value
ratio and increases the default rate.
Macroprudential policy is assumed to operate through a variable lending fraction, with
tighter macroprudential policy associated with a lower lending fraction. In this model, when
the macroprudential authority lowers the lending fraction, perhaps by requiring nancial inter-
mediaries to increase their reserves or raise their loan-loss provisions, nancial intermediaries
must restrict their lending, which leads to an increase in the lending rate and hence in credit
spreads and has an adverse e¤ect on the demand for goods by borrowers, particularly.
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3 Monetary and macroprudential policy framework
In addition to private agents, the model is inhabited by a monetary authority and a macro-
prudential authority and is one in which the policies of each authority can have important
economic e¤ects. Recognizing the models size and complicated structure, we approach the
decision problems faced by the monetary authority and the macroprudential authority in terms
of constrained optimization problems in which each authority chooses its policy to optimize
an objective function, subject to constraints, some of which are forward-looking. We take
the primalapproach and express policy objectives in terms of loss functions that view unfa-
vorably volatility in key macroeconomic aggregates, such as ination, output growth and the
credit-to-GDP ratio. The obvious alternative would be to use welfare-based policy objectives.
We take the approach of speciying policy objectives in terms of loss functions for a couple of
reasons. First, policy goals involving targets for ination and credit-to-GDP ratios appear in
legislation and/or policy mandates, unlike goals expressed (directly) in terms of welfare, and
can be readily captured through loss functions. Second, exercises such as Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2007) showed that welfare-based objectives can often lead to extreme policies, ones in
which policy coe¢ cients need to be articially constrained.2
3.1 Objectives and instruments of the monetary authority
The central bank operates at the union-wide level and its objectives are assumed to be captured
by the following intertemporal loss function:
LCBt = (1  )Et
1X
i=0
i

2t+i + 
CB
y (yt+i   yt 1+i)2 + CBr (rt+i   rt 1+i)2

; (1)
where jj < 1 denotes the central banks discount factor and Et denotes the expectation operator
conditional on information available at time t. With t, yt, and rt representing (union-wide)
ination, output, and the deposit rate (the monetary policy instrument), respectively, the central
bank is assumed to set the deposit rate in order to stabilize union-wide annual ination and
union-wide real output growth, without creating large changes in the deposit rate. The weight
on the ination target is normalized to one, hence the weights on the output gap, CBy > 0, and
on the change in the interest rate, CBr , indicate the importance of stabilizing these variables
relative to stabilizing ination.
As is well-known, in the limit as  " 1, equation (1) converges to:
LCBt = V ar (t) + 
CB
y V ar (yt) + 
CB
r V ar (rt) ; (2)
where V ar (t), for example, denotes the unconditional variance of ination. The central bank
chooses policy to minimize equation (2), subject to restrictions that come from the structural
model, under discretion.
2Further, although it is possible to construct second-order accurate measures of welfare for each household-
type in each region of the model, exactly how to perform the aggregation is unclear. The method of Negishi
(1960) is often invoked, but cannot be used here as it requires the welfare theorems to hold.
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3.2 Objectives and instruments of the macroprudential authority
To dene the macroprudential loss function we consider two distinct cases. In the rst case,
macroprudential policy is conducted at the union-wide level and the macroprudential authority
(or regulator) has the union-wide loss function:
LMPt = (1  )Et
1X
i=0
i
h
MPcr=y(crt+i=yt+i)
2 + MP (t+i   t 1+i)2
i
; (3)
where crt represents credit. Following Quint and Rabanal (2014), the regulator sets the macro-
prudential instrument, t, which inuences credit spreads by a¤ecting the fraction of funds that
nancial intermediaries are able to lend. We assume that the union-wide macroprudential
authority has a double mandate. Specically, it is tasked with stabilizing both the union-wide
credit-to-GDP ratio, crt=yt, without making large changes in the lending fraction, so the weights
on these two objectives, MPcr=y and 
MP
 , respectively, are positive. As earlier, we consider the
limiting case where  " 1 so that the macroprudential authority conducts policy by choosing t
to minimize:
LMPt = 
MP
cr=yV ar (crt=yt) + 
MP
 V ar (t) ; (4)
subject to restrictions reected in the structural model, under discretion.
In the second case, we assume that each region the core and the periphery has its own
macroprudential authority or regulator and that each regulator seeks to stabilize its own regions
credit-to-GDP ratio and to smooth its own lending fraction. For this case, the macroprudential
loss functions for the core and periphery are, respectively:
LMP;ct = (1  )Et
1X
i=0
i
h
MP;ccr=y (cr
c
t+i=y
c
t+i)
2 + MP;c (
c
t+i   ct 1+i)2
i
; (5)
LMP;pt = (1  )Et
1X
i=0
i
h
MP;pcr=y (cr
p
t+i=y
p
t+i)
2 + MP;p (
p
t+i   pt 1+i)2
i
; (6)
where we distinguish between the macroprudential instruments for core and the periphery, ct
and pt , respectively. Again, in the limit as  " 1, these loss functions converge to:
LMP;ct = 
MP;c
cr=y V ar (cr
c
t=y
c
t ) + 
MP;c
 V ar (
c
t) ; (7)
LMP;pt = 
MP;p
cr=y V ar (cr
p
t =y
p
t ) + 
MP;p
 V ar (
p
t ) : (8)
3.3 Strategic interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy
We consider optimal discretionary policies under both cooperation and non-cooperation. Co-
operative policies are the outcome of shared policy objectives while non-cooperative policies
allow the central bank and the macroprudential regulator to have distinct policy objectives.
For the cooperative case, we consider three timing environments. The rst of these timing
environments is where both policymakers move simultaneously whereas the second and third
environments correspond to those where either the monetary authority or the macroprudential
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authority has a rst-mover advantage, i.e., moves rst within the period. These three dis-
cretionary policies are compared to an optimal benchmark, which is described by the optimal
commitment policy under cooperation.
Clearly, the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy will depend
on whether macroprudential policy operates at the regional level or the union-wide level, and
we consider each in turn below.
3.3.1 Cooperation
In the case of a union-wide macroprudential authority, the policy problem involves two play-
ers, a union-wide monetary authority and a union-wide macroprudential authority, whose
policies can potentially interact. When these two policymakers cooperate, their respective loss
functions, equations (2) and (4), are combined into a single joint loss function, which is given
by:
Lcoopt = V ar (t) + 
CB
y V ar (yt) + 
CB
r V ar (rt) + 
MP
cr=yV ar (crt=yt) + 
MP
 V ar (t) : (9)
Where the two policymakers make their decisions simultaneously, we can treat this problem as
one in which there is a single policymaker whose task is to minimize the joint loss function,
Lcoopt , having two instruments at its disposal, i.e. the interest rate rt and t. Although there are
two policy instruments, this decision problem boils down to a standard discretionary problem
and can be solved using standard methods (Dennis, 2007).
As mentioned above, we also consider the cooperative cases where one policymaker (the
leader) has a rst-mover advantage with respect to other policymaker (the follower). In these
cases, the instrument of the leader is chosen rst and the follower sets its instrument taking the
leaders policy into account. With this timing structure, the leader can predict the followers
reaction and exploit this reaction when setting its own policy. We consider both monetary
leadership and macroprudential leadership.
3.3.2 Non-cooperation
Non-cooperation di¤ers from cooperation in as much as the two policymakers do not share a
common objective function. The non-cooperative environments we consider are those where
the monetary authority and the macroprudential authority move separately, but simultaneously,
each formulating their policy to minimize their respective objective functions. Accordingly, rt
and t are chosen simultaneously, with rt chosen to minimize equation (2) and t chosen to
minimize equation (4), subject to constraints imposed by the model equations and with each
policymaker taking as given the decision of the other policymaker.
3.3.3 Regional macroprudential policies
When macroprudential policy is formulated at the regional level the model has two macropru-
dential authorities, one conducting macroprudential policy in the core and the other in the
periphery. Because there are two macroprudential authorities and a union-wide central bank,
the model contains three policymakers with each choosing its policy optimally under discretion.
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With three policymakers all optimizing, the range of strategic environments that could be con-
sidered proliferate. For the cooperative case, the (cooperative) loss function is given as the
sum of their respective loss functions, i.e., the sum of equations (2), (7) and (8):
LCBt + L
MP;c
t + L
MP;p
t = V ar (t) + 
CB
y V ar (yt) + 
CB
r V ar (rt)
+MP;ccr=y V ar (cr
c
t=y
c
t ) + 
MP;c
 V ar (
c
t)
+MP;pcr=y V ar (cr
p
t =y
p
t ) + 
MP;p
 V ar (
p
t ) : (10)
As above, this cooperative loss function is minimized as a standard discretionary problem with
the three instruments, rt, ct , and 
p
t chosen simultaneously.
In addition to the simultaneous-move cooperative case, we also consider the leadership case
where the union-wide central bank has a rst-mover advantage with respect to the two macro-
prudential authorities, who are assumed to choose their policies simultaneously with each other,
but following the central bank. Finally, we also consider the non-cooperative case where the
central bank and the core and periphery macroprudential authorities have di¤ering policy ob-
jectives, governed by equations (2), (7) and (8), respectively.
4 Monetary-macroprudential interactions at union-wide level
In this section we focus on union-wide policymaking and explore the interactions between mon-
etary policy and macroprudential policy for a range of cooperative and non-cooperative envi-
ronments. We begin by comparing optimal discretionary policy to the optimal commitment
policy and to an estimated Taylor-rule policy.
4.1 Taylor rule vs. optimal cooperative policies
The rst three columns of Table 1 compare the models solution with monetary policy conducted
according to an estimated Taylor rule (and with macroprudential policy described by a constant
lending fraction) to the optimal cooperative policies obtained under commitment and discretion
when policymakers move simultaneously. With policymakers cooperating, we assume that the
loss function shared by the monetary authority and the macroprudential authoity is given by
equation (9) with CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP
cr=y = 1, and 
MP
 = 0:5. It is clear from the table that
the biggest gain when going from the estimated Taylor rule policy to optimal cooperative policy
(whether under commitment or discretion) is achieved through annual ination and credit-to-
GDP ratio becoming more stable at the EMU-wide level. Not surprisingly, the decline in
the volatility of the credit-to-GDP ratio is very large as macroprudential policy, in addition to
monetary policy, is used actively to stabilize it. Comparing the commitment and discretionary
policies, the main di¤erence between them that stands out is the higher ination volatility
under commitment. This result might be a bit surprising from the viewpoint of models without
nancial frictions and in which monetary policy only is used for macro-stabilization. However,
in the presence of an additional macroprudential policymaker, and with time-inconsistency
a¤ecting more than just the trade-o¤ between ination and output volatility, higher ination
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volatility under commitment can arise when policy promises, or forward guidance, is directed
more toward stabilizing the credit-to-GDP ratio than towards stabilizing ination.3
The nal column of Table 1 considers the case where only macroprudential policy is optimal
while monetary policy is conducted according to the estimated Taylor rule. Compared to the
cases where both policy instruments are directed at minimizing the joint loss function, when
only macroprudential policy is optimizing the result is higher volatility in both annual ination
and the credit-to-GDP ratio. Interestingly, no stable discretionary solution could be found
when monetary policy only was used to minimize equation (9) (with macroprudential policy set
to deliver a constant lending fraction). This result is due primarily to the high volatility in the
credit-to-GDP ratio, which cannot be e¤ectively addressed by monetary policy only.
Table 1: Some benchmark cooperative solutions
Estimated Taylor rule Optimal cooperative policy Optimal macroprudential policy
(monetary policy = estimated Taylor rule)
CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP
cr=y = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5
Commitment Discretion Discretion
2 1.123 0.159 0.081 1.276
2y 1.973 1.545 1.757 1.744
2r 0.305 0.162 0.287 0.280
2cr=y 82.647 0.027 0.080 0.430
2 0.000 0.163 0.1780 0.188
Lcoop 85.896 1.892 2.150 3.683
Note: The table reports the variances and the unconditional losses under the estimated Taylor rule (and absent
macroprudential policy) and under optimal cooperative policies (commitment and discretion) where the EMU pru-
dential regulator and the central bank jointly minimize equation (9), and the case where macroprudential policy only
acts optimally to minimize equation (9).
The following two gures compare the responses to a risk shock in the periphery and the core,
respectively, under the estimated Taylor rule and the optimal cooperative policies (commitment
and discretion) for the parameterization of the joint loss function (9) considered above. First
of all, the spillover of the shock from the periphery to the core is qualitatively similar to
the spillover of the shock from the core to the periphery, but is quantitatively smaller as the
periphery risk shock has a standard deviation that is twice that of the core. The gures also
reveal only small di¤erences in the responses under commitment and discretion, suggesting that
time-inconsistency considerations do not seem to cause discretionary policy to respond with
great ine¢ ciency to risk shocks. Regarding the di¤erences between the optimal cooperative
policies and the Taylor rule policy, Figure 1 shows that the absence of macroprudential policy
results in a more accommodative interest rate than the optimal polices, which is needed to
address the larger fall in the EMU-wide credit-to-GDP ratio and the deeper recession at the
EMU level. In contrast to the optimal cooperative policies where the shock creates a boom in
the core under the Taylor rule policy the core is also hit by a recession. With both the core
and the periphery experiencing a recession, the Taylor rules policy response is the appropriate
one for both regions.
3With a lower weight assigned to stabilizing the credit-to-GDP ratio in the shared loss function, the usual
stabilization bias associated with discretionary policymaking reasserts itself.
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Figure 1. Impulse responses risk shock in the periphery: estimated TR vs. cooperative
policies (commitment vs. discretion)
Note: The gure plots the responses to a risk shock in the periphery under the estimated Taylor rule
and the optimal cooperative policies (commitment and discretion) for the loss function, equation
(9), with the following weights: CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP
cr=y = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5.
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Figure 2. Impulse responses for a risk shock in the core: estimated TR vs. cooperative
policies (commitment vs. discretion)
Note: The gure plots the responses to a risk shock in the core under the estimated Taylor rule
and the optimal cooperative policies (commitment and discretion) for the loss function, equation
(9), with the following weights: CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP
cr=y = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5.
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4.2 Leadership equilibria
The results above assumed that the central bank and the prudential regular make their policy
decision simultaneously. We now extend upon that analysis by considering the alternative
environments in which either the central bank or the prudential regular moves rst serving as
the leader within the period. The results are shown in Table 2, which compares the solution
under simultaneous move (Nash) to the two leadership cases, where the maintained assumption
is that the policymakers cooperate and therefore share the same loss function, equation (9).
Table 2: Losses under cooperative policy (discretion)
Nash Monetary leadership Prudential leadership
CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP
cr=y = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5
2 0.081 0.078 0.083
2y 1.757 1.758 1.758
2r 0.287 0.288 0.303
2cr=y 0.080 0.084 0.082
2 0.178 0.188 0.178
Lcoop 2.150* 2.158 2.164
Note: The table reports the variances and the unconditional losses in the model under the Nash and Leadership
solutions where the EMU regulator and the central bank both minimize the common loss function, equation (9),
either at the same time (Nash), or in the leader-follower setup.
Although the di¤erences among the losses is small, Table 2 shows that the preferred en-
vironment is the one in which the policymakers choose simultaneously (Nash), for while the
policymaker that moves rst gains from that advantage it does so at the expense of the poli-
cymaker that moves second, with the cost to the follower outweighing the gain to the leader.
However, although the simultaneous-move environment is preferred, the di¤erences in outcomes
across the three decision problems are generally quite small, suggesting that qualitatively and
quantitatively similar results are obtained from this two-player policy problem regardless of the
particular timing assumption made.
4.3 Non-cooperation
Where the previous results related to the case where policymakers cooperated, sharing the same
policy objectives, we now turn to the non-cooperative case. We assign distinct loss functions
to the monetary authority and the prudential regulator in order to assess the extent to which
the conclusions from the previous section, where policymakers cooperate, are impacted.
Table 3 reports the unconditional variances and the losses under cooperative and non-
cooperative equilibria. As before the cooperative environment assumes that the two poli-
cymakers share equation (9) as the loss function. For the non-cooperative policies we assume
that the central bank minimizes the loss function (2) with CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5, and that
the prudential regulator policy minimizers equation (4) with MPcr=y = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5. A key
feature of this assignment is that when added together the loss functions for the central bank
and the prudential regulator has the same structure as the cooperative loss function. With
distinct policy objectives, we consider timing environments in which both policymakers move
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simultaneously (Nash) and in which either the central bank or the prudential authority has a
rst-mover advantage.
Table 3: Comparing cooperation and non-cooperation
Cooperation Non-cooperation
Nash Nash Monetary leadership Prudential leadership
CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP
cr=y = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5
2 0.081 0.100 0.100 0.117
2y 1.757 1.834 1.819 1.835
2r 0.287 0.349 0.3850 0.404
2cr=y 0.080 0.033 0.041 0.031
2 0.178 0.076 0.115 0.080
LCB 1.981 2.108 2.112 2.154
LMP 0.168 0.071 0.098 0.071
Lcoop 2.150* 2.179 2.210 2.224
Lc 37.990 37.882 37.920 37.884
Lp 85.271 37.844 85.213 85.209
Note: The table reports the variances and the unconditional losses under the alternative coordination schemes, where
the prudential regulator minimizes loss function (4) with MPcr=y = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5 and the central bank minimizes loss
function (2) with CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5.
Overall, the cooperative solution outperforms the non-cooperative solutions, driven primar-
ily by greater stability of the monetary policy objectives. Considered from the individual
policymakersperspective, column two shows that the central bank clearly gains from coopera-
tion. In contrast, macroprudential policy would fare better with less cooperation, particularly
under the prudential leadership scheme, as non-cooperation allows the prudential regulator to
better stabilize the credit-to-GDP ratio with smaller changes in the lending fraction. These
conclusions remain valid when a lower weight on output growth is assigned in the central banks
loss function (CBy = 0:5), and when the weight on both smoothing coe¢ cients is increased
(CBr = 
MP
 = 1).
While the policy objectives all relate to union-wide outcomes, we also report in Table 3 the
corresponding losses for the core and the periphery. What we see is that although union-side
policy objectives delivers stability at the union-wide level, this stability masks considerable
volatility at the regional level. In particular, where the credit-to-GDP ratio is very stable
at the union-wide level the underlying credit-to-GDP ratios in the core and the periphery are
very volatile. This result suggests that, while some union-wide stability might be sacriced,
prudential policies directed at stability regional variables might drastically reduce regional-level
volatility.
Figure 3 plots the impulse responses for a positive risk shock in the periphery for the same
parameterization of the loss function weights (2) and (4) as in Table 3, i.e., CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5;
MPcr=y = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5. The gure compares the best of the cooperative and non-cooperative
environments (Nash, in both cases) and shows the consequences of non-cooperation among the
monetary and the prudential authorities when the economy is hit by a positive risk shock in the
periphery. The risk shock increases the lending-deposit spread in the periphery, which lowers
credit and house prices in the periphery, leading to a recession in the periphery. Because the
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union-wide credit-to-GDP ratio decreases, the union-wide prudential regulator loosens, raising
the lending fraction, in order to stimulate lending. The lower credit standards adopted at the
union-wide level, however, leads to a boom in economic activity and to higher ination in the
core. Under cooperation, the ECB slightly increases the interest rate in order to contain union-
wide ination. Under non-cooperation, the ECB is less restrictive than under cooperation, and,
as a result, union-wide ination is slightly higher, while the regional-level variables are largely
una¤ected.
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to a union-wide technology shock. Both the core and
the periphery react in a similar way to the shock, with higher output and lower ination. The
ECB responds to the decrease in union-wide ination by lowering the interest rate, while the
prudential regulator reacts to a higher credit-to-GDP ratio by increasing the lending spreads
in both regions. Under cooperation, however, macroprudential policy loosens, in line with
monetary policys accommodative move, which leads to lower lending spreads and higher credit-
to-GDP ratios in both regions under cooperation than under non-cooperation. As a result, the
union-wide credit-to-GDP ratio increases and takes longer to return to steady state.
Our analysis of non-cooperative policy thus far has assumed that the monetary policy ob-
jective and the macroprudential objectives are distinct, having no overlap. In Table 4, we now
assume that union-wide output growth is assigned as a common goal to the two policymak-
ers. Hence, the individual loss functions have one goal in common, and with equal weights,
i.e., CBy = 
MP
y = 0:5. These weights imply that the central bank cares relatively less than
previously about output growth, but, at the same time, macroprudential policy is now charged
with stabilizing output growth, such that the total weight assigned to growth across the two
policymakers remains equal to 1:0. Of central interest resides in whether the shared objective
closes the gap between cooperation and non-cooperation and even allows the non-cooperative
policy environment to be preferred. The results in Table 4 reveal that assigning a common
objective (with the current parameterization of the model) leaves the central bank best o¤ un-
der the cooperative scheme. However, this is not the case for macroprudential policy, who
gains most from macroprudential leadership by trading o¤ slightly higher output volatility with
more stable macroprudential objectives. Indeed, the gain to the macroprudential policymaker
is such that the combined loss is now smaller under non-cooperation than under cooperation,
suggesting that there can be advantages to allowing the two policymakers to act independently
of each other provided their incentives are guided by a common objective.
In Table 5, we alternatively assign the union-wide credit-to-GDP ratio as a common objective
to the two policymakers, where CBcr=y = 
MP
cr=y = 0:5. In this case the central bank has an
additional objective, while the prudential regulator assigns relatively less importance (with the
weight going from 1:0 to 0:5) to its main objective. Importantly, although now assigned as an
objective to both policymakers, the overall importance of the credit-to-GDP ratio in the joint
loss function remains unchanged, with its weight still equally 1:0. The preferred cooperation
scheme for the individual policymakers is in line with the previous case where output growth
was assigned as a common objective, i.e., macroprudential leadership yields the lowest loss for
the regulator, while the central bank fares best under cooperation. However, the gains from
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Figure 3. Impulse responses for a risk shock in the periphery: cooperation vs.
non-cooperation
Note: The gure plots the impulse responses to a risk shock in the periphery under cooperation
and non-cooperation for the following parameterizations of the loss function weights: CBy = 1 and
CBr = 0:5 in equation (2) and 
MP
cr=y = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5 in equation (4)
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Figure 4. Impulse responses for an EMU-wide technology shock: cooperation vs.
non-cooperation
Note: The gure plots the impulse responses to a positive union-wide technology shock under
cooperation and non-cooperation for the following parameterizations of the loss function weights:
CBy = 1 and 
CB
r = 0:5 in equation (2) and
MP
cr=y = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5 in equation (4)
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Table 4: Comparing cooperation and non-cooperation: output as common goal
Cooperation Non-cooperation
Nash Nash Monetary leadership Prudential leadership
CBy = 0:5; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP
cr=y = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5, 
MP
y = 0:5
2 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.094
2y 1.757 1.846 1.841 1.866
2r 0.287 0.233 0.244 0.276
2cr=y 0.080 0.040 0.044 0.034
2 0.1780 0.116 0.138 0.104
LCB 1.103 1.121 1.123 1.165
LMP 1.047 1.021 1.033 1.019
Lcoop 2.150 2.142* 2.156 2.185
Lc 37.990 37.921 37.945 37.908
Lp 85.271 85.204 85.207 85.205
Note: The table reports the variances and the unconditional losses under the alternative coordination schemes,
where union-wide output growth is assigned as an objective to both policymakers. Hence, the union-wide regulator
minimizes loss function (4) augmented with union-wide output growth with a weight of MPy = 0:5. The central
bank minimizes loss function (2) with CBy = 0:5.
non-cooperation received by the prudential regulator are now not su¢ cient to compensate for
the central banks higher loss, with cooperation remaining the preferred scheme.
Table 5: Comparing cooperation and non-cooperation: EMU-wide credit-to-gdp as
common goal
Cooperation Non-cooperation
Nash Nash Monetary leadership Prudential leadership
CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
CB
cr=y = 0:5, 
MP
cr=y = 0:5, 
MP
 = 0:5
2 0.081 0.097 0.100 0.109
2y 1.757 1.862 1.843 1.861
2r 0.287 0.336 0.367 0.379
2cr=y 0.080 0.063 0.075 0.059
2 0.1780 0.046 0.073 0.050
LCB 2.021 2.159 2.164 2.188
LMP 0.129 0.054 0.074 0.054
Lcoop 2.150* 2.213 2.238 2.242
Lc 37.990 37.877 37.918 37.878
Lp 85.271 85.233 85.243 85.235
Note: The table reports the variances and the unconditional losses under the alternative cooperative schemes, where
the union-wide credit-to-GDP ratio is assigned as a common objective to both policymakers. Hence, the central
bank minimizes loss function (2) augmented with the union-wide credit-to-GDP ratio with a weight of CBc=y = 0:5.
The union-wide prudential regulator minimizes loss function (4) with MPcr=y = 0:5.
4.4 A robustness exercise
In this section we briey consider an alternative loss function for the prudential regulator, one
that depends on the credit spread rather than on the credit-to-GDP ratio. Table 6 shows
the simulation results for the case where the union-wide credit-to-GDP ratio is replaced by
the union-wide average spread between the lending and deposit rate in the macroprudential
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policymakers loss function.
Table 6: Comparing cooperation and non-cooperation: alternative measures of -
nancial stability
Cooperation Non-cooperation
Nash Nash Monetary leadership Prudential leadership
CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP
spread = 1, 
MP
 = 0:5
2 2.028 2.200 2.199 2.197
2y 2.281 2.388 2.389 2.388
2r 0.915 1.301 1.302 1.324
2spread 0.043 0.012 0.012 0.012
2 0.067 0.051 0.053 0.051
LCB 4.766 5.238 5.239 5.247
LMP 0.080 0.037 0.038 0.037
Lcoop 4.843* 5.275 5.277 5.285
Note: The table reports the variances and the unconditional losses under the alternative cooperative schemes, where
the central bank minimizes loss function (2) and the EMU regulator minimizes loss function (4), and where the spread
instead of the credit-to-GDP ratio is used as nancial objective in the latters loss function.
Looking at Table 6, the results and conclusions are qualitatively in line with those reported
in Table 3. Specically, the cooperative scheme delivers outcomes that are preferred to the
three non-cooperative schemes, the central bank benets from cooperative while the prudential
regulator prefers non-cooperation, and the environments with leadership generate outcomes that
are very similar to the simultaneous move (Nash) case.
4.5 Optimal assignment of objectives and weights under non-cooperation
In this section we assume that societys loss function is represented by the benchmark cooper-
ative loss function adopted in the previous simulations:
Lsocietyt = V ar (t)+
CB
y V ar (yt)+
CB
r V ar (rt)+
MP
cr=yV ar (crt=yt)+
MP
 V ar (t) (11)
where CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP
cr=y = 1 and 
MP
 = 0:5. Society minimizes the above loss
function with respect to the policy instruments rt and t. The outcome of this optimization
exercise will serve as a benchmark and used to help assign the individual loss functions under the
non-cooperative solution. Following Debortoli et al. (2015) and Gelain and Ilbas (2016), the
objectives and the weights in the individual loss functions under non-cooperation are chosen
to match or improve upon the benchmark cooperative policy. We nd that the following
assignment of loss functions do a reasonably good job of approximating the outcome achieved
under the benchmark cooperative optimization:
LCBt = V ar (t) + 
CB
y V ar (yt) + 
CB
r V ar (rt)
for monetary policy, where CB = 1:5; 
CB
y = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5 and
LMPt = 
MP
cr=yV ar (crt=yt) + 
MP
y V ar (yt) + 
MP
 V ar (t)
for macroprudential policy, where MPcr=y = 1:5; 
MP
y = 1; 
MP
 = 0:5. The non-cooperative
solution with these individual loss functions yields a total loss of 2:127, when evaluated at the
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benchmark loss, equation (11), compared to 2:150 obtained under the cooperative solution.
Concerning the loss function assigned to the central bank, we nd that a higher weight on
ination than society is required in order to improve on the cooperative outcome. Greater
weight on ination stabilization ensures better control over ination stabilization under non-
cooperative, with some of the (relative) importance of stabilizing output growth being passed to
the prudential regulator. As a result, both policymakers have a common objective, i.e., output
growth, that helps to bring the non-cooperative outcome closer to the cooperative outcome
(see also Gelain and Ilbas, 2016). Introducing the output growth component in the prudential
regulators loss function leads to a higher weight than society on the credit-to-GDP ratio in
order to ensure its stabilization under non-cooperation.
5 Interactions between monetary policy and regional macro-
prudential authorities
We now assume that macroprudential policy is conducted at the regional level, i.e., that there
is a prudential regulator in the core and another in the periphery and that each one of them is
charged with safeguarding nancial stability in its own region. Their focus on their own region
sees these prudential authorities ignoring outcomes in the other region and at the EMU-wide
level. As before, the central bank is in charge of conducting monetary policy at EMU-wide
level. Because there are three players, a much wider range of strategic interaction schemes can
be considered than in the two-player case. However, we focus on what we believe are the three
most interesting cases: the cooperative solution and the two non-cooperative solutions where
all policymakers move simultaneously (Nash) and where the ECB has a rst-mover advantage
with respect to the two prudential regulators (monetary leadership).
Table 7 reports the results for the case where the ECB minimizes its usual loss function,
equation (2), and the regulators in the core and the periphery minimize their region-specic loss
functions, equations (7) and (8), respectively. The loss functions for the prudential authorities
include the regional credit-to-GDP ratio and smoothing of the regional lending fraction. In the
cooperative solution the shared loss function is given by the sum of the loss functions for the
three policymakers. The results indicate that, although the central bank prefers the cooperative
environment, both regional prudential authorities prefer outcomes under the simultaneous move
non-cooperative solution. Because the two prudential authorities desire to focus on their
own regions, they can be more e¤ective at stabilizing these variables in the non-cooperative
solution than if they cooperate with the ECB, or follow its actions in the leader-follower setup.
Interestingly, in the absence of commitment, societys loss, LCB+MP;c+MP;p, is lower in the
simultaneous move non-cooperative solution than it is in the cooperative solution, suggesting
that some level of regional-based macroprudential policymaking can be desirable.
Figure 5 plots the responses to a risk shock in the periphery under the policy schemes
considered in Table 7. Unlike the case where there was a common prudential regulator at
the EU level where this risk shock causes a boom in the core , when we allow for separate
regulators to respond to regional variables this is no longer the case. The reason is that
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Table 7: CComparing coperation and non-cooperation: three policymakers
Cooperation Non-cooperation
Nash Nash Monetary leadership
CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP;c
crc=yc = 1, 
MP;c
c = 0:5, 
MP;p
crp=yp = 1, 
MP;p
p = 0:5
2 0.082 0.100 0.101
2y 1.817 1.830 1.815
2r 0.328 0.353 0.391
2crc=yc 0.081 0.048 0.055
2c 0.142 0.118 0.161
2cp=yp 0.064 0.061 0.068
2p 0.199 0.180 0.221
LCB 2.062 2.107 2.111
LMP;c 0.153 0.107 0.136
LMP;p 0.163 0.152 0.179
LCB+MP;c+MP;p 2.378 2.366* 2.426
Note: The table reports variances and the unconditional losses under the alternative non-cooperative schemes, where
the central bank the minimizes loss function (2) with CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5, the cores prudential regulator minimizes
equation (7) with MP;ccrc=yc = 1, 
MP;c
c = 0:5, and the peripherys regulator minimizes equation (8) with 
MP;p
crp=yp = 1,
MP;pp = 0:5.
macroprudential policy in the periphery loosens in response to the recession created by the
shock, while the regulator in the core counteracts the immediate spillover e¤ect of the shock
that hits the periphery by increasing the lending-deposit spread, which has a restraining e¤ect
on the credit-to-GDP ratio and output in the core. As a result, ination slightly decreases
in the core as well, which also leads to lower EMU-wide ination, to which monetary policy
reacts by lowering the nominal interest rate. The net result of the opposing regional prudential
policies is that the shock has a more synchronized e¤ect across the core and the periphery.
The scope for conducting independent macroprudential policy leads to diverging policy re-
sponses when the risk shock hits only the periphery. The picture however changes somewhat
when we consider a common, area-wide technology shock. Because both economies are a¤ected
similarly by the shock, the regional prudential authorities respond in a similar way. There-
fore, the e¤ects of the shock and the policy responses resemble closely those obtained when
macroprudential policy is operated at the common EMU-level. The added value of allowing
for independent prudential policies hence mainly arises from the possibility of responding more
e¢ ciently to the spillover e¤ects arising from region-specic shocks.
In Table 8, the regional prudential authorities are assumed to receive, in addition to their
existing objectives described in equations (7) and (8), the goal of stabilizing output growth in
their respective region. Moreover, the ECB is assumed to place weight on stabilizing these
region-specic output growth variables, instead of EMU-wide output growth. Introducing this
common objective between the ECB and each regional authorities does not alter the earlier
nding that society prefers the non-cooperative Nash solution to the cooperative solution.
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Figure 5. Impulse responses for a risk shock in the periphery
Note: The gure plots the impulse responses to a risk shock in the periphery under alternative in-
teraction schemes (cooperation, non-cooperation, and monetary leadership) for the following para-
meterizations of loss function weights: CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5 in equation (2), 
MP;c
cr=y = 1, 
MP;c
 = 0:5
in equation (7), and MP;pcr=y = 1, 
MP;p
 = 0:5 in equation (8).
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Figure 6. Impulse responses for an area-wide technology shock
Note: The gure plots the impulse responses to a common area-wide technology shock under
alternative interaction schemes (cooperation, non-cooperation, and monetary leadership) for the
following parameterizations of loss function weights: CBy = 1; 
CB
r = 0:5 in equation (2), 
MP;c
cr=y =
1, MP;c = 0:5 in equation (7), and 
MP;p
cr=y = 1, 
MP;p
 = 0:5 in equation (8).
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Table 8: Comparing cooperation and non-cooperation: three policymakers with
additional objectives
Cooperation Non-cooperation
Nash Nash Monetary leadership
CByc = 0:3; 
CB
yp = 0:2; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP;c
crc=yc = 1, 
MP;c
c = 0:5, 
MP;c
yc = 0:3; 
MP;p
crp=yp = 1, 
MP;p
yp = 0:2; 
MP;p
p = 0:5
2 0.081 0.079 0.078
2yc 2.035 2.109 2.102
2yp 1.915 1.979 1.972
2r 0.326 0.239 0.252
2crc=yc 0.087 0.054 0.058
2c 0.138 0.124 0.157
2crp=yp 0.067 0.061 0.066
2p 0.194 0.183 0.214
LCB 1.238 1.227 1.229
LMP;c 0.766 0.748 0.767
LMP;p 0.547 0.548 0.567
LCB+MP;c+MP;p 2.551 2.523* 2.563
Note: The table reports the variances and the unconditional losses under the alternative non-cooperative schemes,
where the central bank the minimizes loss function (2) with CByc = 0:3; 
CB
yp = 0:2; 
CB
r = 0:5, the prudential
regulator in the core minimizes equation (7) with MP;ccrc=yc = 1, 
MP;c
 = 0:5, 
MP;c
yc = 0:3, and the peripherys
regulator minimizes equation (8) with MP;pcr=y = 1, 
MP;p
yp = 0:2; 
MP;p
 = 0:5.
5.1 Common objective for the central bank and the prudential policies across
the core and periphery
Table 9 reports the simulation results when EMU-wide output growth is assigned as a common
objective in the loss functions of the three policymakers. It becomes clear from the table that
introducing a common objective does not changes signicantly the story that emerged earlier
based on separated objectives (Table 7). In order to better stabilize the objectives of the three
policymakers, separating the loss functions and allowing each policymaker to act independently
from the others therefore seems to be a better strategy because it compensates to a certain
degree for the lack of independent monetary policy in the regions.
23
Table 9: Losses under alternative coordination schemes: cooperation vs. non-
cooperation: three policymakers with a common EMU-wide objective
Cooperation Non-cooperation
Nash Nash Monetary leadership
CBy = 0:5; 
CB
r = 0:5; 
MP;c
crc=yc = 1, 
MP;c
c = 0:5, 
MP;c
y = 0:3; 
MP;p
cr=y = 1, 
MP;p
y = 0:2; 
MP;p
p = 0:5
2 0.082 0.078 0.078
2y 1.817 1.900 1.892
2r 0.328 0.240 0.254
2crc=yc 0.081 0.049 0.053
2c 0.142 0.124 0.158
2crp=yp 0.064 0.060 0.065
2p 0.199 0.180 0.214
LCB 1.154 1.148 1.150
LMP;c 0.698 0.680 0.700
LMP;p 0.527 0.529 0.550
LCB+MP;c+MP;p 2.378 2.358* 2.400
Note: The table reports the variances and the unconditional losses under the alternative non-cooperative schemes
with EMU-wide output growth as a common objective assigned to the regional prudential policy makers. Therefore,
the core minimizes loss function (7), augmented with EMU-wide output growth, MP;cy = 0:5, and the periphery
minimizes loss function (8), augmented with EMU-wide output growth MP;py = 0:5.
6 Conclusion
We use an estimated DSGE model of the EURO area to study the interaction between mon-
etary policy and macroprudential policy in a monetary union. The model is one in which
monetary policy and macroprudential policy interact through the behavior of savers and bor-
rowers and through the balance sheets of nancial intermediaries, with the economic e¤ects
of tighter monetary policy potentially o¤set through looser macroprudential policy (a higher
lending fraction). A useful feature of the model is that it contains two regions the core and
the periphery which allows the e¤ects of union-wide and region-specic policies and shocks
on both the core and the periphery to be explored. We assume that policymakers behave
purposefully, but do not have access to a commitment technology, so that monetary policy and
macroprudential policy are each formulated to be optimal under discretion. With policymakers
optimizing, we consider a range of cooperative and non-cooperative decision problems, examine
the e¤ects of leadership, and compare the implications of having two region-focused rather than
a single union-wide-focused prudential regulator.
Using the optimal commitment policy as one benchmark we nd that the discretionary
stabilization bias leads to ine¢ cient responses to shocks, but in a way that is di¤erent from
DSGE models that focus only on monetary policy. With time-inconsistency also a¤ecting the
prudential regulator, ination volatility is actually lower under discretion than commitment, a
result that arises as policymakers use policy promises to instead secure greater stability in the
credit-to-GDP ratio, the nominal interest rate, and in the lending fraction. In both cooperative
and non-cooperative environments, we found little benet to policy leadership, regardless of
whether it was the monetary authority or the prudential regulator that had the rst mover
advantage. Indeed, when both monetary policy and macroprudential policy are both conducted
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at the union-wide level, the preferred decisionmaking environment had policymakers cooperating
and choosing their policies simultaneously. However, although union-wide policies were able
to successfully stabilize union-wide variables, we found that this stability masked considerable
underlying volatility at the regional level. In particular, the credit-to-GDP ratio remained
highly volatile in both the core and the periphery while being very stable in the union as a
whole. Focusing on non-cooperative policies but assigning real union-wide GDP growth as a
common objective led to non-cooperation outperforming cooperation, but it did not remove the
excessive regional-level volatility in the credit-to-GDP ratio.
Introducing regional-level prudential regulators we found that non-cooperation performed
better that cooperation, provided policymakers choose their policies simultaneously. With
the regional prudential regulators focusing on regional-level outcomes and the central bank
focusing on union-wide outcomes, giving the monetary authority a rst-mover advantage can be
detrimental because it leads to a greater focus on union-wide variables. With macroprudential
policy conducted at the regional level the excessive regional-level volatility in the credit-to-GDP
ratio is eliminated, but at the expense of slightly higher volatility in union-wide ination and
output growth.
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7 Appendix I - Solution Procedure
With two regions, two productive sectors, and two types of households, along with regional
and international nancial intermediaries and a host of real and nominal rigidities, the model
is large, containing over 100 equations. To solve for the optimal discretionary policies we draw
on the solution methods developed by Dennis (2007) which can be applied to larger models
because they do not require the model to be put in a state space form. De Paoli and Paustain
(2013) extended the methods in Dennis (2007) to two-player settings, and the solution methods
we employ in this paper are straightforward extensions of that work.
In what follows we describe the solution for both the simultaneous move and the leader-
follower cases, both of which work with the equations summarizing the model expressed in the
form
A0yt = A1yt 1 + A2Etyt+1 + A3xt + eA3ext + A4Etxt+1 + eA4Etext+1 + A5vt; (12)
where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, xt is the vector of policy instruments for one
policymaker, ext is the vector of policy instruments of the other policymaker, vt  i:i:d:[0;
] is
a vector of stochastic disturbances, and the matrices A0A5 contain the models parameters.
For convenience we will label the policymakers 1 and 2, then the loss functions for the two
policymakers are assumed to be given by
Loss1 = E0
" 1X
t=0
t

y
0
tWyt + x
0
tQ1xt + ex0tQ2ext
#
; (13)
Loss2 = E0
" 1X
t=0
et y0tfWyt + x0t eQ1xt + ex0t eQ2ext
#
; (14)
where the W and Q matrices (symmetric and positive semi-denite) contain the policy pref-
erences of the two policymakers. In the case where the two policymakers cooperate the loss
function parameters must satisfy  = e, W = fW, Q1 = eQ1, and Q2 = eQ2. The two dis-
count factors,  and e, lie between 0 and 1. Note that equations (24) and (25) di¤er from
De Paoli and Paustain (2013) because they allow each policymakers loss to depend on both
policymakers policy instruments, not just their own. Although the solution methods described
below are closely related to those presented in De Paoli and Paustain (2013), we present them
below, partly for completeness and partly because our use of di¤erent loss functions leads to
di¤erent updating equations.
7.1 Simultaneous move
Employing results from Dennis (2007), the conjectured solution is
yt = H1yt 1 + H2vt; (15)
xt = F1yt 1 + F2vt; (16)ext = eF1yt 1 + eF2vt; (17)
allowing the constraints (equation 12) to we written as
Dyt = A1yt 1 + A3xt + eA3ext + A5vt; (18)
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where
D = A0  A2H1  A4F1   eA4eF1: (19)
After a few substitutions and exploiting the properties of convergent geometric series we
obtain
Loss1 =

A1yt 1 + A3xt + eA3ext + A5vt0 D0 1PD 1 A1yt 1 + A3xt + eA3ext + A5vt
+x
0
tQ1xt + ex0tQ2ext + 1   tr hF02Q1F2 + eF02Q2eF2 + H2PH2
i ; (20)
Loss2 =

A1yt 1 + A3xt + eA3ext + A5vt0 D0 1ePD 1 A1yt 1 + A3xt + eA3ext + A5vt
+x
0
t
eQ1xt + ex0t eQ2ext + e
1  e tr
h
F
0
2
eQ1F2 + eF02 eQ2eF2 + H2ePH2
i ; (21)
where
P = W + 

F
0
1Q1F1 +
eF01Q2eF1 + H01PH1 ; (22)eP = fW +  F01 eQ1F1 + eF01 eQ2eF1 + H01ePH1 : (23)
Di¤erentiating Loss1 with respect to xt and Loss2 with respect to ext gives the rst order
conditions
@Loss1
@xt
= A
0
3D
0 1PD 1

A1yt 1 + A3xt + eA3ext + A5vt+ Q1xt = 0; (24)
@Loss2
@ext = eA03D0 1ePD 1

A1yt 1 + A3xt + eA3ext + A5vt+ eQ2xt = 0: (25)
The simultaneous move solution can now be obtained using the following iterative scheme
1. Initialize H1, H2, F1, F2, eF1, and eF2.
2. Compute D using equation (18), P using equation (22) and eP using equation (23).
3. Update H1, H2, F1, F2, eF1, and eF2 according to
F1 =  

Q1 + A
0
3D
0 1PD 1A3
 1
A
0
3D
0 1PD 1(A1 + eA3eF1);
F2 =  

Q1 + A
0
3D
0 1PD 1A3
 1
A
0
3D
0 1PD 1

A5 + eA3eF2 ;
eF1 =  eQ2 + eA03D0 1ePD 1 eA3 1 eA03D0 1ePD 1(A1 + A3F1);eF2 =  eQ2 + eA03D0 1ePD 1 eA3 1 eA03D0 1ePD 1 (A5 + A3F2) ;
H1 = D
 1

A1 + A3F1 + eA3eF1 ;
H2 = D
 1

A5 + A3F2 + eA3eF2 :
4. Iterate over steps 2 4 until convergence.
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7.2 Leader-follower
For the leader-follower case, to ease exposition let us designate policymaker 1 as the leader and
policymaker 2 as the follower. Then the conjectured reaction function for the follower takes
the form ext = eF1yt 1 + eF2vt + Lxt; (26)
with the remainder of the conjectured solution continuing to be given by equations (15) and (16).
With this reaction function, policymaker 1 can take the behavior (reaction) of policymaker 2
into account when formulating policy.
The solution procedure now precedes as before. Substituting the conjectured solution into
the constraints gives equation (18), but where now D is given by
D = A0  A2H1  A4F1   eA4eF1   eA4LF1: (27)
Then the loss functions for the two policymakers are given by
Loss1 = y
0
tPyt + x
0
tQ1xt + ex0tQ2ext + 1   tr

F
0
2Q1F2 +
eF2 + LF20 Q2 eF2 + LF2+ H2PH2
 ;(28)
Loss2 = y
0
t
ePyt + x0t eQ1xt + ex0t eQ2ext + e
1  e tr

F
0
2
eQ1F2 + eF2 + LF20 eQ2 eF2 + LF2+ H2ePH2
 ;(29)
where
P = W + 

F
0
1Q1F1 +
eF01Q2eF1 + H01PH1 ; (30)
eP = fW + F01 eQ1F1 + eF1 + LF10 eQ2 eF1 + LF1+ H01ePH1 : (31)
After substituting equations (18) and (26) into the two loss functions, di¤erentiating them
with respect to xt and ext , respectively, gives
@Loss1
@xt
:

A3 + eA3L0 D0 1PD 1 A1 + eA3eF1yt 1 + A3 + eA3Lxt + A5 + eA3eF2vt
: +Q1xt + L
0
Q2
eF1yt 1 + eF2vt + Lxt = 0; (32)
@Loss2
@ext = eA03D0 1ePD 1

A1yt 1 + A3xt + eA3ext + A5vt+ eQ2xt = 0: (33)
The leader-follower solution can now be obtained using the following iterative scheme
1. Initialize H1, H2, F1, F2, eF1, eF2 and L.
2. Compute D using equation (27), P using equation (30) and eP using equation (31).
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3. Update H1, H2, F1, F2, eF1, eF2 and L according to
F1 =  

Q1 + L
0
Q2L +

A3 + eA3L0 D0 1PD 1 A3 + eA3L 1


A3 + eA3L0 D0 1PD 1(A1 + eA3eF1 + L0Q2eF1);
F2 =  

Q1 + L
0
Q2L +

A3 + eA3L0 D0 1PD 1 A3 + eA3L 1


A3 + eA3L0 D0 1PD 1 A5 + eA3eF2 + L0Q2eF2 ;
eF1 =  eQ2 + eA03D0 1ePD 1 eA3 1 eA03D0 1ePD 1(A1 + A3F1);eF2 =  eQ2 + eA03D0 1ePD 1 eA3 1 eA03D0 1ePD 1 (A5 + A3F2) ;
H1 = D
 1

A1 + A3F1 + eA3eF1 + eA3LF1 ;
H2 = D
 1

A5 + A3F2 + eA3eF2 + eA3LF2 ;
L =  (eQ2 + eA03D0 1ePD 1 eA3) 1 eA03D0 1ePD 1A3:
4. Iterate over steps 2 4 until convergence.
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